The relation between consciousness and other cognitive functions is a much debated issue. There is, for example, a lively debate on the relation between consciousness and attention (e.g., Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007) . A less debated, but highly prominent relation in cognitive theories on consciousness is between consciousness and working memory (WM). In his global workspace theory, Baars (1988) proposed that the content of consciousness corresponds to what is present in WM. Global workspace theory suggests that unconscious specialized processors compete with each other to enter a global workspace (Dehaene, Kerszberg, & Changeux, 1998) . Information that enters this global workspace is information that makes it to consciousness. According to Baars, the global workspace in his model can be equated to WM. A similar intimate relationship between WM and consciousness was proposed in the attended intermediate-level representations (AIR) theory of Prinz (2000) . AIR theory suggests that consciousness arises when intermediate-level perceptual representations are made available to WM via attention. The link between consciousness and WM becomes even more explicit if consciousness is described as "the remembered present" (Edelman, 1989) . In his theory of neuronal group selection, Edelman (1989) explicitly proposed that we become aware of our environment by activating, combining, and maintaining memories. An image we consciously experience is reconstructed on the basis of memory and stored in so-called convergence-divergence zones in association cortices (Damasio, 1989) . In sum, cognitive theories of consciousness propose a strong conceptual overlap between WM and consciousness.
An overlap between WM and consciousness is also observed at the neural level. Studies on the neural correlates of consciousness have stressed the importance of a prefrontal parietal network (PPN; e.g., Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Edelman, Gally, & Baars, 2011; Rees, Kreiman, & Koch, 2002) . Empirical evidence for the involvement of the PPN in consciousness has been revealed with different imaging techniques like functional magnetic resonance imaging (Sahraie, Hibbard, Trevethan, Ritchie, & Weiskrantz, 2010), electroencephalography (EEG; Del Cul, Baillet, & Dehaene, 2007) , and iEEG (Gaillard et al., 2009) . Of special interest for the present study is a patient study showing that damage to the prefrontal cortex changes the threshold for subjective visibility (Del Cul, Dehaene, Reyes, Bravo, & Slachevsky, 2009) . In this study, a visual masking paradigm was used to investigate the threshold for visual consciousness in patients with focal frontal lesions. The threshold for subjective visibility was increased in patients with lesions in the prefrontal cortex. The role of the PPN in WM processes is also well established. Indeed, a recent metaanalysis of 189 WM studies revealed core activation in the PPN (Rottschy et al., 2012) . Interestingly, the PPN involved in WM has been shown to overlap to a great extent with the network involved in consciousness (Bor & Seth, 2012; Courtney, Petit, Haxby, & Ungerleider, 1998) . Furthermore, the observation that the detection of changes in orientation or motion depends on the number of distractors (e.g., Hesselmann, Niedeggen, Sahraie, & Milders, 2006) has led to the suggestion that a dopaminergic sensory gating mechanism in basal ganglia that determines the encoding of a stimulus in WM (O'Reilly, 2006 ) is a necessary condition for its conscious perception (Kiefer et al., 2011) . Although the relation between sensory gating in WM and subjective visibility remains speculative, we recently provided some evidence for this relation by showing a close relation between dopaminergic binding in basal ganglia and the threshold for subjective visibility (Van Opstal et al., 2012) .
These strong links between consciousness and WM already hint at a close relationship, but to our knowledge, their intimate relation has not been tested before. Here, we set out to study this relation in two ways. First, the impact of WM on subjective visibility (i.e., the (un)conscious visual experience of the subject) was investigated. The threshold for subjective visibility is expected to change with WM load, as indicated by previous research that showed interference when two concurrent tasks overlap in neural structure (e.g., Fias, Lauwereyns, & Lammertyn, 2001; Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003; Klingberg & Roland, 1997; Pinel, Piazza, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 2004) , in information properties (Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990) , or in cognitive mechanisms (Lucas & Lauwereyns, 2007) . More specifically, just like a decrease in prefrontal cortex capacity due to brain damage increased the threshold for subjective visibility (Del Cul et al., 2009) , we predicted that a decrease in prefrontal cortex capacity caused by WM load would also increase the threshold for subjective visibility. Second, we wanted to investigate how WM load affects a function that is often related to consciousness, namely, cognitive control. When a target stimulus is presented adjacent to distractor stimuli, reaction times (RTs) to the target are typically slower when the distractor stimuli evoke a different response than the target stimuli (incongruent trials), compared with when the distractors and the target evoke the same response (congruent trials) (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974 ). An increase in WM load (i.e., a decrease in WM resources) causes the irrelevant distractor stimulus to hinder the response to a target stimulus more, resulting in an increased congruency effect (Lavie, 2005) . Researchers have suggested that the increase in the congruency effect is caused by a decrease in the availability of cognitive control resources, reflected in a failure to properly inhibit the irrelevant distractor stimuli (Kelley & Lavie, 2011) . Similarly, a congruency effect is also typically observed in subliminal priming experiments in which an unconscious prime stimulus that precedes a target stimulus affects the target response (e.g., Dehaene, Naccache, et al., 1998; Van Opstal, Reynvoet, & Verguts, 2005) . However, because cognitive control is often related to consciousness (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001) , it remains to be investigated whether the effect of WM load on the congruency effect is limited to tasks in which a distractor is consciously presented.
To test the interaction between consciousness, WM, and cognitive control, we created a masking task (similar to Del Cul, Dehaene, & Leboyer, 2006 ) that participants had to perform while WM load was manipulated by varying the memory set size (Sternberg, 1966 ). In this masking task, a prime number is presented very briefly and followed by a mask (i.e., a target number and three letters in a diamond shape). Typically, a congruency effect is observed in the time it takes to categorize the target number as smaller or larger than five (Dehaene, Naccache, et al., 1998) . The time between the presentation of the prime and the mask (i.e., the stimulus onset asynchrony [SOA] ) determines the size of the congruency effect (Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, & Schwarzbach, 2003) and the subjective visibility of the prime (Charles, Van Opstal, Marti, & Dehaene, 2013; Vorberg et al., 2003) . On the basis of the percentage of seen trials in each SOA condition, the threshold of subjective visibility can be estimated. In the concurrent Sternberg task, participants had to indicate whether a probe letter was part of a series of letters they had to remember.
Method Participants
Thirty-one university students from Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium, participated in this experiment for course credits. None of the participants was aware of the purpose of the experiment.
Stimuli and Procedure
The experiment consisted of a masking task presented during a WM task.
Masking task. Prime and target stimuli consisted of Arabic digits 1, 4, 6, and 9. The prime was a single digit. The target number was part of a mask that was composed of three letters and a number. The letters of the mask were always the same, namely, two Ms and an E (see Figure 1 ). Stimuli were presented in black on a white background in Courier New font. The presentation of the stimuli was synchronized with the refresh rate of the screen (60 Hz).
A fixation cross was presented at the center of the screen during the whole experiment. Every trial was announced by a cue in the form of a larger fixation cross for 150 ms. After this, the fixation cross returned to its normal size. 800 ms after disappearance of the cue, the target was presented. Between the disappearance of the cue and the target, a prime number could be presented for 16 ms. The time between the onset of the prime and the target (henceforth referred to as the SOA) varied between 16, 33, 50, 66, or 100 ms. Catch trials were introduced in which no prime was present; only a target display was presented. On every trial, a random selection of the SOA (or catch trial) was made. The target was presented for 200 ms. After the presentation of the mask, a blank screen (i.e., with only the fixation cross) was presented for 1,000 ms. During this window, participants had to respond. At the start of the experiment, half the participants were instructed to press a left or right key when the target number was larger or smaller than five, respectively. The mapping was reversed for the other half of participants. After this response window, a visual feedback signal was presented for a period of 750 ms. Visual feedback encouraged participants to respond faster if no response was registered and was empty otherwise.
After the feedback, subjective visibility was tested by asking participants whether they had seen the prime number by presenting "seen" and "unseen" to the left and right of the fixation cross (the position was counterbalanced within every subject). Participants had to press the button corresponding to their answer. After a response was registered, a new trial started. The masking task was presented in short blocks of seven trials. Primes, targets, and SOA were randomly selected on every trial.
WM task. Before the start of the first masking trial, a sequence of zero (fixation cross only; no-load condition), two (lowload condition), or six (high-load condition) letters was presented in the center of the screen. Letters were all consonants, and no This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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letters were repeated within a sequence. This display remained on the screen for 3 s, and participants were instructed to remember the letters until they were probed with a memory cue. When the display with the letter sequence disappeared after 3 s, the first masking trial was presented. After seven masking trials (henceforth called a memory block), a memory cue appeared in the center of the screen. This cue could either be a letter that was part of the sequence they had to remember (50%) or not (50%). Participants then had to press on the left or right key to indicate whether the letter was present or not present in the sequence. Present/not present was randomly assigned to the left and right key on every trial by presenting it on the left or right side of the screen. When a response was collected, a new memory sequence was presented to the participants, starting a new memory block. In total, the experiment consisted of 525 masking trials, presented in 75 memory blocks of seven trials each. Every 15 memory blocks, participants were given the opportunity to rest until they gave a sign to continue with the experiment. Prior to the experiment, participants were given a training phase of six memory blocks.
Results
Four participants were excluded from further analysis: Two participants were excluded because of unreliable measures in subjective visibility (no visibility at the longest SOA, or 50% visibility for all SOAs, even in the case when no prime was presented); two participants were excluded because of high error rates in the number comparison task (Ͼ35%).
WM Effect on Subjective Visibility
To investigate whether WM load affects subjective visibility, the results of the subjective visibility measure (seen or unseen responses) were analyzed. As can be seen in Figure 2A , similar to previous studies (Charles et al., 2013; Vorberg et al., 2003) , the percentage of seen trials followed a sigmoid with increasing SOA.
We therefore modeled responses with the logistic equation:
with response (seen ϭ 1, unseen ϭ 0) as the dependent variable (y), and SOA as predictor (x). This was done for all three memory conditions (no load, low load, and high load) for every participant. The logistic equation provided an excellent fit to the responses for every memory condition (McFadden, 1979 ; mean McFadden's pseudo-R 2 of .34, .32, and .35 for the no-load, low-load, and high-load condition, respectively). The subjective visibility threshold was then defined by the inflection point of the modeled sigmoid (Del Cul et al., 2009) . A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), with factor memory load (no load, low load, and high load) on the visibility thresholds, revealed a significant effect of memory load, F(2, 52) ϭ 3.75, p Ͻ .05, p 2 ϭ .126, indicating that the threshold increased with memory load (46, 48, and 50 ms for no load, low load, and high load, respectively; see Figure 2B ). Planned comparisons revealed a significant linear increase of the threshold with WM load, F(1, 26) ϭ 7.41, p Ͻ .05, p 2 ϭ .222. The percentage of seen trials for all SOAs in the different memory conditions is reported in Table 1 .
WM Effect on Prime Processing
In a second analysis, the impact of WM load on the congruency effect was investigated. Because the congruency effect increases with increasing SOA (e.g., Schwarz & Mecklinger, 1995; Vorberg et al., 2003) , the impact of WM load was analyzed with SOA as a factor. Therefore, a 2 (congruency: congruent and incongruent) ϫ This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. Figure 3A) . Most importantly, the interaction between memory load and congruency was also significant, F(2, 52) ϭ 3.38, p Ͻ .05, p 2 ϭ .115. Planned comparisons revealed a significant congruency effect with a high load (488 and 464 ms for incongruent and congruent trials, respectively), t(26) ϭ 3.49, p Ͻ .005, and with a low load (482 and 465 ms for incongruent and congruent trials, respectively), t(26) ϭ 2.46, p Ͻ .05. No congruency effect was observed in the no-load condition (484 and 481 ms for incongruent and congruent trials, respectively; t Ͻ 1). A significant increase in the difference between congruent and incongruent trials (i.e., the congruency effect) with increasing WM load, F(1, 26) ϭ 5.89, p Ͻ .05, p 2 ϭ .165, was observed (see Figure 3B) . No main effect of memory load was observed (p ϭ .10), indicating that the impact of the memory load on target classification was similar across conditions (mean RTs of 484, 475, and 477 ms for no-, low-, and high-memory load, respectively). The three-way interaction was not significant, F(8, 208) ϭ 1.267, p ϭ .26. Interestingly, a significant correlation between the increase in the threshold and the increase in the congruency effects was found, t(27) ϭ 2.61, p Ͻ .05, r ϭ .46, suggesting a common mechanism or mediating factor at the origin of the increase in the effects.
The same analysis on the error rates (overall error rate was 10.5%) revealed a main effect of SOA, F(4, 104) ϭ 12.69, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .328. Average error rates were 8.2, 8.4, 11.1, 12.2, and 14.7 for SOAs 16, 33, 50, 66, and 100 ms, respectively. There was also a main effect of congruency, F(1, 26) ϭ 7.72, p ϭ .010, p 2 ϭ .229, with more errors on incongruent (11.9%) compared with congruent (9.9%) trials. The interaction between SOA and congruency was also significant, F(4, 104) ϭ 2.97, p ϭ .023, p 2 ϭ .103 (see Figure 3A) . Planned comparisons showed an increase in the congruency effect with increasing SOA, F(1, 26) ϭ 5.37, p Ͻ .05, p 2 ϭ .200 (congruency effects of 0.6, Ϫ0.3, 3.4, 2.4, and 5.3% for SOA 16, 33, 50, 66, and 100, respectively), with significant effects for SOA 50, t(26) ϭ 2.36, p Ͻ .05, and for SOA 100, t(26) ϭ 2.85, p Ͻ .01. No significant effects involving memory load were observed (all Fs Ͻ 1).
Discussion
We investigated the interaction between WM load and subjective visibility. Because of the conceptual and neural overlap of WM and consciousness, it was expected that the threshold for subjective visibility and prime processing changes with WM load. Our results clearly confirmed this: As WM load increased, the threshold for subjective visibility increased. Furthermore, the effect of the prime on the target response increased with WM load.
Although our results show a clear effect of WM on the threshold for subjective visibility, it could be argued that this does not reflect a true shift in the threshold. First, the shift in prime visibility could be caused by an overall task impairment that might have led to a decrease in visibility ratings. However, our results show no effect This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
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of WM load on task performance: RTs on target classification did not differ between WM load conditions, indicating that WM load did not affect overall task execution. Second, the change in visibility could be caused by a more conservative subjective bias when WM load increases similar to a recent observation with spatial attention (Rahnev et al., 2011) . To estimate the subjective bias in the present experiment, we looked at the false-alarm rate (i.e., the percentage of "seen" responses on the catch trials, and compared these across different memory conditions). This revealed no difference across conditions (F Ͻ 1; 6.3, 6.4, and 6 .0 for the no-load, low-load, and high-load conditions, respectively), indicating that there was no difference in response bias between memory conditions. In sum, the increased subjective visibility threshold due to increasing WM load cannot be attributed to its overall effect on task performance or a conservative response bias. Most importantly, WM load had opposite effects on the threshold for subjective visibility and on prime processing: A decrease in subjective visibility was accompanied by an increase in prime processing. This result is reminiscent of other findings showing an inverse relation between congruency effects and stimulus visibility (e.g., Stoerig, 2011) . When prime visibility decreases with increasing SOA, it can be observed that the congruency effect increases (Mattler, 2005; Schmidt et al., 2011; Vorberg et al., 2003) . In the present article, however, WM load caused the opposite effects rather than SOA.
The opposite effects of WM on subjective visibility and on the congruency effect can be explained by assuming a decrease in available resources, possibly caused by a neural or functional overlap between working memory, consciousness, and cognitive control. For example, if the identification of a visual stimulus is related to the encoding of the stimulus in WM (Bundesen, Habekost, & Kyllingsbaek, 2005) , subjective visibility would be directly related to available WM resources. Similarly, in line with a recent observation that higher prestimulus activation in the PPN biased participants to miss an auditory stimulus (Sadaghiani, Hesselmann, & Kleinschmidt, 2009 ), brain activation in the PPN caused by maintaining information could impede new sensory information to enter awareness. Although the exact mechanism remains to be investigated, it is possible that dopaminergic activity in the basal ganglia that regulates WM processes in the PPN prevents new information to enter the PPN by closing the sensory gate while information has to be maintained (O'Reilly, 2006) .
A similar mechanism could also explain the increase in the congruency effect with increasing WM load. Similar to previous research, the increased congruency effect observed in our results could be the result of a decrease in the control of visual information with increasing WM load (Kelley & Lavie, 2011) . In fact, an increase in the congruency effect with increasing WM load is a common finding in this research (e.g., Lavie, Hirst, De Fockert, & Viding, 2004) . In a typical experiment, a target stimulus is flanked by a distractor stimulus that can be congruent or incongruent with the target stimulus. Participants need to classify the target stimulus while WM load is manipulated. Typically, distractor processing increases under high-WM load compared with low-WM load, as evidenced by an increase in the congruency effect with high-WM load. It has previously been suggested that cognitive control mechanisms to minimize intrusion from an irrelevant distractor are hindered by WM load, possibly because of an overlap in the brain areas involved in WM and these control mechanisms (e.g., Lavie et al., 2004) . More specifically, the decrease in the control of visual information under high-WM load may be caused by an impairment of selective attention mechanisms. Previous work showed that selective attention decreases under WM load (de Fockert, Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 2001; Pratt, Willoughby, & Swick, 2011) , whereas other studies have demonstrated the importance of (temporal) attention in congruency priming (e.g., Kiefer & Brendel, 2006; Naccache, Blandin, & Dehaene, 2002) . Naccache and colleagues (2002) , for example, showed that the primes had to be presented within a small temporal attentional window around the onset of the target for a congruency effect to appear (but see Kiefer & Brendel, 2006) . The increase in the congruency effect with higher WM load in our experiment can be explained if a decrease in selective attention because of WM load resulted in a less focused attentional window. Because of the decrease in focused This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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attention under higher WM load, the prime could have entered the attentional window, resulting in larger priming effects. The absence of a congruency priming effect with no WM load could then be explained by highly focused selective attention in this condition. Although this result stands in contrast to other priming studies with the same design that did not manipulate WM (e.g., Del Cul et al., 2009), the WM manipulation in our experiment could have increased the control in the no-load condition leading to no intrusion of the prime on the target decision.
To conclude, the results of this study provide empirical evidence for the theoretical claim of a close relationship between WM, consciousness, and cognitive control by showing that WM load affects the threshold for subjective visibility and congruency priming. Although future research is needed to determine the exact nature of this relationship, we tentatively propose that the observed interference is caused by the neural overlap of the brain areas involved in these functions, thereby suggesting a critical role of the PPN in consciousness, possibly driven by sensory gating in basal ganglia.
